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Trust and Distrust in the Resolution of Protracted Social Conflicts: The Case of 
Colombia 
In protracted social conflict, trust between the contending parties is absent and distrust 
can prevent or undermine attempts to find a sustainable resolution. It is important to 
recognise distrust as an active process, distinct from low trust or the absence of trust. 
Previous work has identified the difference between thick (internal) and thin (social) 
trust bonds within and between groups. Recognising the varied nature of trust and 
distrust can provide opportunities to create mechanisms to bridge divides. It may be 
possible to create institutions able to guarantee agreements, as leading actors persuade 
followers by calling on thick trust. This paper examines the negotiation of the peace 
agreement between the Government of Colombia and the FARC, following more than 
50 years of conflict. The aims of the paper are to (1) identify the form and extent of 
trust and distrust between parties, and (2) determine how distrust was managed in 
negotiating the peace agreement. The findings point to the ability of elite actors to 
develop thin trust through repeated formal interactions and in turn use thick trust to 
bind followers.  
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Introduction 
Trust has been identified as key in resolving protracted social conflicts, as it enables the 
development of spaces necessary to establish a viable peace process (Brahimi and Salman, 
2008). Processes aimed at resolving conflict operate across multiple-levels, as negotiators must 
gain the approval of various actors in distinct phases within a complex socio-political dynamic. 
Ties of trust and distrust are dispersed unevenly between actors and across these levels, having 
built up and solidified over time (see Anheier and Kendall, 2002; Bijlsma-Frankema et al, 
2015). Combatant groups may have developed high levels of internal trust and similarly high 
levels of distrust regarding outsiders and opponents in order to maintain cohesion and 
commitment. Distrust of outsiders can serve as a mechanism for bonding members of a group 
by forming a collective identity that is ‘produced and reproduced, negotiated and renegotiated, 
in the interactions of individuals embedded in particular sociocultural contexts’ (Hunt and 
Benford, 2004: 447). Resolving such protracted conflicts requires more than simply engaging 
trust-building mechanisms, as the identity of combatant groups is forged in conflict and distrust 
of the opponent. Resolving protracted conflict may paradoxically involve weakening internal 
trust bonds to allow space for the removal of distrust towards other actors. 
 
The peace process in Colombia symbolises a milestone in efforts to settle one of the world’s 
most protracted violent conflicts. The roots of the conflict rested on a combination of factors 
including socio-economic inequality, political exclusion, weak state structures, land ownership 
and spatial fragmentation, all of which are conducive to violence (see Feldman, 2017). In this 
context, the negotiation of a comprehensive peace agreement in 2016 represents a significant 
achievement and provides an important point of reference for the development of political 
solutions to protracted conflicts (Sanchez and Illingworth, 2017). The conflicting parties appear 
to have taken stock of their own past failures and drawn lessons from other peace processes in 
determining a way forward (Westminster Hall Debate, 2019). An important element in the 
negotiations was the involvement of external actors, serving as guarantors and intermediaries. 
This approach facilitates conflicting parties to overcome distrust by relying on the 
establishment of formal safeguards managed by the external actors (see Lumineau, 2017). 
Distrust between the parties remained, but was reduced over time through the formulation of 
shared goals enabling a shift in identity over time (MacGinty and Özerdem, 2019; Kroc 
Institute, 2019). 
 
Colombia represents a valuable case study when considering how pervasive distrust can be 
managed in formulating the resolution of protracted conflict. The article focuses on the 
negotiation of the peace agreement in 2016 between the Government of Colombia and the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC – Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia), following more than 50 years of conflict. The aims of the article are to: (1) identify 
the form and extent of trust and distrust between parties, and (2) determine how distrust was 
managed in negotiating the peace agreement. The article is divided into four sections. In the 
first section, the features of conflict resolution and the role of trust building mechanisms (TBM) 
in achieving and sustaining peace are examined. The article then focuses on the nature of trust 
and distrust, identifying their characteristics and the interaction between them. The third 
section outlines the methodology used to structure the case study. The fourth section presents 
a close examination of the resolution of conflict in Colombia, examining the mechanisms used 
to disrupt entrenched patterns of distrust and formulate a sustainable peace. The paper 
concludes by revisiting key elements of the Colombian negotiations to reflect on how the 
management of trust and distrust enabled agreement between the parties to the conflict. 
 
Negotiating Conflict Resolution 
Transitioning from violent to non-violent conflict entails the realisation among conflicting 
parties that a purely military solution is no longer the preferred option. Instead, the exploration 
and development of the possibilities to engage with the opponent in a constructive dialogue, 
replaces the focus on armed confrontation. In a situation of intractable conflict, varied and 
complementary approaches, responding to the many concerns and fears of the conflicting 
parties, are needed to achieve an accommodation (Bercovitch, 2014). For such a process to 
advance, all actors involved need to reach a point where they have a lot to gain and little to lose 
from entering into negotiations (Deutsch, 1960). A detailed and well-structured peace process 
generates hope for commitment from the parties involved to resolve conflict peacefully. By 
contrast, a loosely-structured peace process, coupled with the experience of past failure, can 
lead to a fear of the alternative and the possible escalation of conflict. This results as actors 
seek to safeguard their position in the face of uncertainty, demonstrating the critical importance 
of establishing stable social relations in conflict resolution.  
 
Considering the roots that underpin violent conflict and work against the initiation of lasting, 
sustainable conflict resolution, we find issues of trust and distrust. The commitment required 
to sustain a conflict suggests bonds between members of each party to the conflict. The high 
costs associated with failure ensure adherence to a common goal. At the same time, it also 
implies an inability or unwillingness to recognise the validity of the opponent’s position, a 
feeling rooted in distrust. These bonds are dynamic, subject to change over time in response to 
external conditions and shifts in internal interests. Characterising this dynamism, Bar Tal et al 
(2016: 210) argue that: 
even distrust that plagues intractable conflicts can be changed in a long, gradual, and 
nonlinear process… [and] the changing of distrust depends on the intensity of the 
ongoing conflict and especially the degree of violence. 
This clearly points to the need to focus on reducing levels of distrust through the creation of 
trust building mechanisms (TBM). Effective TBMs are important, as they can mend 
relationships, suggest commitment to resolution, humanise the other, and facilitate the 
transformation from opponent to interlocutor. Therefore, any change must begin with the 
establishment of trust, providing a foundation for reconstituted relationships. Such processes 
must be grounded in a reduction in the intensity of conflict to be able to take root. 
 
A key actor from the outset of the conflict resolution process is the broker, sitting outside of 
the conflict. Brokers who are seen as legitimate to actors on both sides are more able to bridge 
the divide and begin to forge ties (Goddard, 2012; Cunningham, 2013). The acceptance of a 
broker depends on their ability to represent or embody values recognised by all participants. A 
complex conflict resolution necessitates multi-level and multi-actor mediation, reflected in the 
distinct roles brokers take on. The type of brokers needed range from shorter-term and more 
limited problem-solving, through to transformative actors, focused on mending and building 
sustainable relationships. Within the negotiation process, the broker can play an important role 
in providing reassurance when transparency is not viable. Striking a balance between secrecy 
and open disclosure in the negotiation process is vital. Where talks remain secret, there is a risk 
that suspicions will be raised and excluded parties may resist or attempt to disrupt progress 
(USIP, 2012; MacGinty and Özerdem, 2019). Talks that are opened too soon may undermine 
progress, as the bonds between contending parties may be too fragile to withstand public 
scrutiny and critique. An effective broker may therefore be able to smooth some of these 
tensions and respond to demands from parties inside and outside the talks. 
 
Any change that begins with the building and the use of TBMs constitutes an effective means 
of establishing and deepening the relationship needed to sustain the process (Kreutz and 
Nussio, 2019). TBMs are a series of intentional actions, agreed upon and implemented by the 
conflicting parties, without focusing initially on the root causes of conflict. Trust-building is 
based on measurable and tangible components, but trust has to do with a psychological state, 
meaning elements of perception and subjectivity are central. The problem that arises is that 
trust-building is reciprocal by nature, so that one party does not take all the risk and make itself 
vulnerable. Failure to reciprocate in such a setting can lead to the collapse or reversal of 
progress made (Darby and MacGinty, 2008). Another challenge with goodwill gestures is that 
they are not necessarily measured in an equal manner. Recognising such divergent positions is 
an important element, as apparently small sacrifices may be heavily weighted by the experience 
and expectation of other actors. Appropriate use of TBMs is a vital auxiliary to establishing a 
peace process, necessitating equal commitment with equal impact creating a pragmatic 
working space to deal with the causes of conflict. 
 
A detailed and well-structured peace process generates hope for commitment from the parties 
involved to resolve the conflict peacefully, which would enhance trust. A less thorough and 
more loosely-structured peace process, in conjunction with certainties of past derailed efforts, 
leads to the fear of the alternative to a peace process and the possible escalation of the violent 
conflict. This point highlights the complexity. If the paramilitary organisation for instance, gets 
it wrong then internal trust and cohesion are jeopardised, while a refusal to decommission 
would add further strain in an environment of distrust between the organisation, the 
government and the general population. Consequently, resolving deeply rooted and protracted 
conflicts cannot be limited to linear trust building. Organisations and groups are not 
homogeneous, and often they have varied degrees of loyalty to ‘the cause’ and of beliefs and 
commitment in a peace process. The risk is that this can lead to internal discontent and to an 
increase of internal distrust, which may create spoiler groups breaking away from the 
negotiation process. 
 
If there is no political commitment and if parties are not entering negotiations in good faith, 
TBMs by themselves cannot resolve a conflict (MacGinty and Özerdem, 2019). Instead, TBMs 
become a stalling mechanism and can deflect or postpone negotiations on core issues 
(Desjardins, 1996). Desjardins (1996) argues that parties may be wary of TBMs, as they may 
be seen as the beginning of a slippery slope, leading to constraints and reduced autonomy. As 
a stalling mechanism, TBMs and concessions can be successful and end up acquiring a life of 
their own, distracting focus from negotiations. The paradox is that there must be sufficient 
TBMs to create a working space while leaving enough discontent with the status quo to ensure 
determination and commitment to negotiate are maintained. To this end, Pillar advocates 
getting to the table with a limited agenda aiming to reach an agreement to open negotiations, 
subtle or ambiguous enough, so that neither of the parties involved will have to admit to its 
own public that it backed down (Pillar, 1983: 83; Herbolzheimer, 2019). Consequently, a 
minimal willingness to risk trusting each other and the peace process is essential to negotiate 
mutually acceptable outcomes, as expectations regarding the actions of the other party shift 
from negative to positive. 
 
The socially constructed nature of conflict resolution points to the need to ensure external 
actors are considered. The role of the broker is noted above, but the view of other affected 
parties, such as neighbouring states, also needs to be weighed in negotiations. The inclusion of 
civil society in the wider peace process in particular is important for ensuing the development 
of stable, lasting resolutions. In cases of amnesty or advance release of members of conflicting 
parties may be a TBM necessary to keep participants engaged in negotiations. Such acts may 
be problematic or unpalatable for communities that have been victims of protracted conflict. 
Ensuring civil society support in spite of these actions is important in facilitating trust across 
conflict cleavages initially, but also in supporting the medium-term implementation of 
agreements (Abdi and Wachira, 2008). Initiatives that bring together representatives from the 
community can help create an atmosphere of trust within civil society and the peace process.  
 
The process of negotiating a resolution rests on the ability to establish and strengthen trust 
among all parties. Trust building is not just between parties to the conflict, but also stakeholders 
within society. Deeply rooted patterns of distrust must be dealt with and a paradigm shift is 
needed from violent and confrontational attitudes towards tolerance and humanisation of the 
other. In the case of Colombia for instance the leaders of FARC were called the social leaders 
(Santos, 29 October 2019). The challenge with this process is the complex and multi-faceted 
nature of both trust and distrust. To fully understand what is required in the dual process of 
reducing distrust and building trust, it is necessary to consider the characteristics of each. 
Rather than existing on a spectrum, it is argued that distrust and trust are active processes that 
operate alongside and in opposition to one another. The paper now examines the components 
of trust and distrust as a way of building on the approach to conflict resolution outlined above. 
 
Trust, Distrust and Identity 
The ability to establish meaningful TBMs and bridge divides between conflicting groups 
requires a deeper understanding of trust and distrust. Previous work on conflict situations has 
highlighted the importance of trust (Bar-Tal et al, 2016; Cox, 2008; Booth and Wheeler, 2007; 
Pillar, 1983). At the simplest level, trust is the belief that another party will follow through on 
an expectation. Möllering (2001) argues that while the experience (interpretation) can serve as 
a guide regarding what may happen (expectation), it is necessary to suspend concern regarding 
the failure of expectations. As a social exercise, trust is a process that will be strengthened or 
weakened over time through repeated exposure. Such relationships are at the core of TBMs, as 
exposure creates a foundation on which more fundamental concerns can be addressed. The 
dynamic nature of trust means that bonds between parties will be repeatedly tested, as bridging 
the gap and trusting another party carries the risk of failure (frustrated expectations).  
 
There is an additional level of challenge in conflict situations, as the risks are amplified by 
significantly higher costs of failure. To understand the depth of antipathy and the effects of the 
conflict divide, it is necessary to consider the distinct character of distrust. Bijlsma-Frankema 
et al (2015: 1020) argue for a fuller treatment of distrust, noting that: 
distinct from low trust, which reflects the lower end of a continuum of positive 
expectations, distrust appears to occupy its own cognitive state, a pervasive negative 
lens through which others are perceived. 
Identifying distrust in the manner highlights the challenge facing TBM efforts, as distrust 
between parties will require steps to dismantle negative views before or in conjunction with 
efforts to build trust. Tracing the roots of distrust, Saunders et al (2014: 659) argue it is 
‘prompted by incidents of injustice or harm’, in contrast to low trust, related to passive issues 
such as lack of competence. Adopting a negative perspective in this manner leads to a situation 
where ‘wariness, watchfulness, and anticipation of injurious conduct’ (Lumineau, 2017: 1557) 
characterise social relations. In this way, distrust is seen as a protection mechanism. 
 
Distrust is likely to be pervasive in a conflict situation, represented in the fact that contending 
parties are unable to find non-violent routes to resolve differences. Emphasising the importance 
of the context in creating distrust, Guo et al (2017) note a negative (distrustful) perspective will 
be more likely where scarcity, competition or negative institutions prevail. In such settings, 
‘Distrust simplifies the social world’ (Lewicki et al, 1998: 444) making it easier for individuals 
and groups to act, as they can disregard the views of the other. Distrust can therefore serve as 
a protection against the risks of failure, pre-empting and reducing potential harms. Within the 
broader frame of distrust, lower levels are identified as domain specific and compartmentalised 
(Bijlsma-Frankema et al, 2015), potentially allowing actors to identify areas where trust 
building efforts can be targeted. Where distrust is pervasive, the ability to bridge the divide is 
reduced, requiring efforts to lower levels of distrust and identify areas that can serve to initiate 
cooperation. As with trust, distrust is an active process, involving conscious decisions based 
on an assessment of the prevailing conditions.  
 
When considering trust and distrust in conflict settings it is also necessary to recognise the 
importance of group bonds. Within the broad framework of trust, a division is made between 
thick (particularistic) trust based on shared identity or experience, and ‘thin trust or social trust, 
based on everyday contacts, professional acquaintance networks’ (Anheier and Kendall, 2002: 
350). These two types of trust are not mutually exclusive and co-exist within and between 
different areas of social interaction. Thin trust works to smooth the functioning of the social 
order (Khodyakov, 2007). The willingness to take the risk represented by thin trust is premised 
on the idea that ‘People may reap the rewards of solving larger-scale collective actions’ 
(Uslaner, 2002: 9), reinforcing the social character of trust. Where conflict is prevalent, thin 
trust is less likely to exist, as social polarisation and unpredictability prevents the formation of 
the necessary ties as well as the idea of a collective good (Clark, 2012). In such a situation, 
pervasive distrust between opponents can block attempts to cooperate, reinforcing the need for 
TBMs focused on addressing areas of low-level distrust. Targeting domain specific areas can 
serve as a way to begin to forge thin trust, which actors can begin to rely on.  
 
The strength of thick trust rests on bonds that are reinforced through repeated exposure, leading 
to the creation of maintenance of a shared identity. Outlining the characteristics of identities, 
Hunt and Benford (2004: 447) argue they are ‘a cultural representation, a set of shared 
meanings that are produced and reproduced, negotiated and renegotiated, in the interactions of 
individuals embedded in particular sociocultural contexts.’ Construction of a shared identity 
provides a basis on which actors can generate commitment that can manage institutional 
failure. Frederiksen (2012) reinforces this point, noting that bonds of thick trust can move 
beyond bounds of expectation, as breaches are more likely to be tolerated, suggesting a more 
stable and robust form of social relation. The cost associated with maintaining and honouring 
thick trust means that it is deployed more selectively. Returning to the role of identity, Tilly 
(2003: 132) argues that they can enable the ‘activation of available us-them boundaries’. In a 
conflict situation, these boundaries can serve as a means of binding the group, while sustaining 
distrust to outsiders, as ‘uncertainty rises across the boundary as actors on each side have less 
reliable information (and hence more exaggerated estimates) concerning the likely actions on 
the other side’ (Tilly, 2003: 76). Therefore, in a conflict situation thick trust may hinder 
attempts to reduce levels of distrust through the implementation of TBMs. As collective 
identities are latent, activating in response to perceived threats (Klandermans, 2004), the 
external locus of control embodied by distrust (Guo et al, 2017) can become a self-perpetuating 
process, leading actors to resist efforts to bridge divides. 
 
The distinct character of trust and distrust makes strategies to build trust and reduce distrust 
particularly challenging with different approaches required for each. Whereas building trust 
relies on successful repeated interactions, the task of tackling distrust is more complicated and 
involves loosening thick within-group bonds in favour of establishing generalised trust bonds. 
Addressing this point, Lumineau (2017: 1563) notes that ‘when distrust is based on non-
calculative judgements, a strong focus on contractual control may diminish the negative 
outcomes of distrust’. Lewicki et al (1998: 439) support this point, arguing that ‘both trust and 
distrust involve movements toward certainty: trust concerning expectations of things hoped for 
and distrust concerning expectations of things feared.’ Bijlsma et al (2015) note, distrust builds 
over time through a self-reinforcing cycle, so reduction in distrust must also develop in a 
cyclical fashion. As noted, the aim is to reduce distrust sufficiently to allow space for trust 
building, as Guo et al (2017: 24) note ‘Trust and distrust must work together as fundamental 
elements to a strategic relationship’. The result being that while individuals trust, recognition 
of shared values by the organisation may enable de-escalation at the elite level that can then 
influence individuals at lower levels. Where the strength of internal trust bonds is sufficiently 
robust to convey a reduced sense of vulnerability de-escalation may be possible.  
 
More sustainable forms of generalised trust therefore rest on institutions and practices that can 
guarantee a degree of certainty and predictability. Kaina (2011: 285) notes that, in such 
relations, institutions can play a supporting role as ‘they relieve people from uncertainty… 
[and] make social action more predictable’. The significance of such institutions derives from 
the fact that they provide mechanisms by which boundaries between in-groups can be 
transcended or managed. When addressing this point, Vanneste (2016: 7) notes that ‘it is people 
who trust – not organizations’, with the effect that individuals will have varying levels of trust, 
potentially increasing or decreasing the likelihood of trust between organisations or groups 
being sustained. To facilitate the transition to trust a key element is a reduction in the level of 
value incongruence to a level at which common goals can be identified (Bijlsma-Frankema et 
al, 2015). Situations of protracted conflict present a clear case of value incongruence and strong 
shared identities developed over a period of time and repeated interactions. In such context, the 
costs of failure (frustrated expectations) are high, making the transition from distrust to trust a 
considerable challenge. Having outlined the relationship between conflict resolution efforts 
and trust, the paper next turns to consider the case of the negotiated peace in Colombia. 
 
Methodology 
Through the application of a qualitative approach the article builds up from primary and 
secondary document analysis and aims to provide an empirically in depth account of specific 
phenomena. The article focuses on the single case study analysis of the Colombian peace 
process, and the theorised causal mechanisms underlying the role of trust in the peace 
negotiations are tested using process tracing. The analysis adopts an exploratory approach that 
seeks to explain a specific episode with a theory-guided case study. For the process tracing, the 
data collection is through primary sources, including government material and statements from 
the Colombian government, as well as documents and proceedings from the peace process. In 
this way the decisions and the sequence of events which led to the outcome are traced to 
determine if the mechanisms in the first part of the article are present and valid. This approach 
incorporates ‘single-outcome’ studies concerned with establishing causal inference (Gerring, 
2006). The incorporation of an inductive approach has the advantage of potentially producing 
new hypotheses, either specific to the case study or possibly generalisable and applicable to 
further cases.  
 
Examining the question of distrust management in the resolution of the protracted conflict of 
Colombia is highly relevant when it comes to the incorporation of more effective trust building 
efforts, especially against the background of other protracted social conflicts. The single case 
study analysis provides the opportunity for ‘thick description’ and for a level of detail and 
understanding that allows for the in-depth analysis of the complex and idiosyncratic nature of 
distinct phenomena (Yin, 2009). Beach and Pedersen (2013) identify three different types of 
process tracing: theory-building, theory-testing and explaining-outcome process tracing. The 
current research engages in explaining-outcome process tracing, which is theory-guided 
research, and aims to find an explanation for a puzzling outcome in a specific case (Beach and 
Pedersen, 2013: 3). The research follows a theory-testing approach as it tests the applicability 
of the concepts of thin and thick trust during the Colombian peace process. Moreover this case 
study portrays a puzzling outcome in a single case, with the Colombian process reaching a 
relatively successful outcome despite the lack of trust or the presence of predominantly thin 
trust and the resistance from the conflicting parties and general population. Consequently, 
explaining-outcome process tracing is a fitting and viable methodological approach.  
 
The Protracted Conflict in Colombia and the Peace Process   
For the last five decades Colombia has faced a violent intrastate conflict, with an excess of 
200,000 deaths, thousands of forced disappearances and kidnappings, and approximately 7 
million people displaced (Registro Único de Victimas, 2019). In the period 1964-1971 a 
number of non-state armed groups emerged in Colombia, and the roots of their campaign lies 
in La Violencia, a ten-year civil war from 1948-1957 between the Liberal and Conservative 
parties in Colombia. These non-state actors were concentrated predominantly in rural areas and 
grew to control significant proportions of territory. The FARC were initially formed in the 
1960s to defend the rural poor, rebalance resource distribution and to overthrow the 
government, with deep roots in left-wing ideology. Since its founding, the FARC became a 
major military force, deeply embedding itself into the licit and illicit socio-economic life of 
Colombia (Saab and Taylor, 2009). Over the years, it managed to maintain significant public 
support, and became impossible to defeat by purely military means (Villamarin-Pulido, 2017). 
 
The protracted nature of the conflict means that there have been several attempts to find a 
negotiated resolution (Table 1). The first conflict resolution effort was in 1984 when the 
Colombian government and the FARC agreed a ceasefire. One of the outcomes of the 
agreement was the creation of the leftist political organisation Patriotic Union (PU) in 1985. 
However, over 3,000 members of the PU were killed by paramilitary organisations connected 
to the United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), often in collusion with state security 
forces (Schemo, 1997). The ceasefire broke down in 1987 and three years later the talks 
officially ceased. In 1999, the Colombian government and the FARC initiated a second effort 
to resolve the conflict. However, following from the previous experience, distrust was high and 
the conflicting parties limited themselves to ‘talking about talks’, failing to address any of the 
structural issues. Consequently, this second round of talks also collapsed, and the government 
of Álvaro Uribe adopted a more martial solution as a way out of the conflict. Within this 





The most recent round of talks, known as the Havana talks, were the third major attempt to 
reach a negotiated agreement (Table 1). The main strength of this round of talks derived from 
innovative frameworks introduced by the conflicting parties to manage distrust. These 
frameworks can be summarised as being inclusive, positioning the rights of the victims at the 
epicentre of the talks, the creation of a Gender Subcommission, and planning for the 
implementation well before the agreement was signed. A significant difference of the Havana 
talks with previous peace efforts is the inclusive nature with regard to subjects and participants. 
The process combined greater depth, as indicated by its different frameworks, and greater 
breadth, based on the parties prepared to come to the table, and the number of the international 
brokers involved. In 2010, Juan Manuel Santos, Defence Minister under President Álvaro 
Uribe, gained power and shifted the emphasis towards a negotiated agreement, even though 
ongoing military operations kept pressure on the FARC. Santos won by a landslide with 69% 
of the vote, which was the largest in the history of Colombia (Port of Destiny, 2018). Under 
Uribe’s tenure, sixteen FARC leaders were killed, and forty-seven were killed under Santos by 
2013, which was a year over into the Havana talks (Priest, 2013). In parallel there were secret 
talks with the FARC in preparation for the negotiations in Havana in 2012. This latest round 
of talks, which started in Norway and then moved to Havana, led to the General Agreement for 
the Termination of the Armed Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace 
(General Agreement, 2016).  
 
Prior to the negotiations, the government acknowledged the key root causes of the armed 
conflict and initiated a process of legislative reforms to address the deeply rooted problems of 
victims and of land dispossession. This change signalled the preparedness of the Colombian 
government to initiate a process of a peaceful resolution and, in turn, the FARC publicly 
pledged to stop the kidnapping of civilians and the recruitment of children. Procedurally, the 
peace process in Colombia was clearly structured with several measures to protect from 
derailment and safeguard progress. The adoption of the negotiating rule that ‘nothing is agreed 
until everything is agreed’ (World Report News, 2017) provided the necessary flexibility to absorb 
the impact of constantly changing circumstances, and the reassurance needed in such a 
protracted conflict where trust has been chronically low on many levels or there has been high 
distrust. Given the killings of the mid-1980s mentioned above, in the recent round of talks the 
main immediate concern of the FARC was personal security, as protection was in the hands of 
their former enemy. This required a significant leap of faith from FARC, as it can be 
challenging for any organisation to decommission before they feel they have secured 
compliance and commitment to resolve a conflict. During the transitional period from violent 
conflict towards negotiations there have been shifts within the FARC where the ‘hawks’ were 
put to the background, while the ‘doves’ were brought to the fore to give peace a chance.  
 
In 2016 the Colombian government and the FARC issued a joint communiqué asking the 
Security Council to establish a political mission consisting of unarmed international observers 
and civilians, drawn predominantly from the Community of Latin American and Caribbean 
States (Granma, 2016). A week later the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 
2261 establishing this kind of political mission to monitor and verify a definitive ceasefire, and 
the decommissioning of weapons (UN, 2016). The FARC would have to lay down its weapons 
within six months of the signing of the final accord with the decommissioning process to be 
implemented by the Colombian armed forces, the FARC, and a 500-member unarmed UN 
team, charged with monitoring and verification (Chatham House, 2016). However, the limited 
six-month mandate of the UN team also required ties to be established relatively swiftly. A 
valuable innovation of the General Agreement was the distinction between the talks, which 
took place in Cuba between the Colombian government and the FARC with a limited agenda 
(conflict termination), and the broader peace process, which would take place after the signing 
of the agreement, with the broad participation of the Colombian population (conflict 
transformation).  
 
There were a number of conditions that led to the signing of the agreement. Santos summarised 
the key conditions as  
 
the landslide victory in 2010, giving me a strong mandate. Also what was different this 
time was that there was the imagination and vision that the conflict could be resolved, and 
there was willingness to learn from past processes (1999, 100-points agenda), and I was 
prepared to look outside the borders at other peace processes, such as Northern Ireland and 
Palestine (Santos statement, 29 October 2019). 
 
At the same time Santos adopted a pragmatic approach toward the peace process and 
confidence building, and he ‘negotiated as if there is no terrorism. Neither hawk nor dove. An 
effective hawk to achieve peace’ (Santos statement, 29 October 2019). He stated that ‘they 
[FARC] could sustain the conflict for 8-10 years more and realised that I needed the FARC 
weakened, so I asked for help for intelligence from the UK’ (Santos statement, 29 October 
2019). On the other the FARC has a monolithic structure, which according to Santos was easier 
to deal with it (Santos statement, 29 October 2019). As is often the case with protracted social 
conflicts and their resolution, there are different explanations regarding the decision of the key 
conflicting parties to negotiate. Certain analysts attribute this decision to the systematic military 
weakening of the FARC, especially under Uribe’s militaristic approaches discussed above, but 
also under Santos, as his previous statement makes clear. Other analysts attribute the decision 
to negotiate on the high and increasing socio-economic costs of the conflict on the state. Indeed 
the FARC had been weakened, but were not entering negotiations from a position of defeat. 
The months prior to the talks saw increased attacks on coal, gas, oil infrastructures, which 
accounted for 50 percent of total foreign direct investment in Colombia (Rettberg, 2015: 7). 
Still, although the FARC had enough funds to continue the war, they did not have enough to 
win the war without negotiations with their unavoidable concessions and compromises. 
According to Enrique Santos, brother of Juan Manuel Santos, and his extensive pre-negotiation 
talks with the FARC, the organisation no longer considered the armed struggle the main or 
most realistic mean to achieve their long term political goals (Santos Calderón, 2014: 71). 
 
To facilitate trust building there also had to be internal changes within the government and 
within the FARC. As discussed in the first part of the article, there were numerous instances 
where the participants had to sacrifice internal trust bonds to allow space for the removal of 
distrust towards other actors. During the negotiations for instance, Santos showed his 
preparedness for the state to criticise its own record and to correct historic injustices (Santos 
Calderón, 2014: 47). Likewise, aware of the strong internal opposition, the Colombian 
Congress passed a law that protects the peace agreement from possible amendments by later 
administrations (Marco Jurídico para la Paz, 2017). On the other, by placing the victims in the 
epicentre of the process, the FARC also had to face the fact that in the name of their struggle 
they had committed violations of human rights. The leader of the FARC Rodrigo Londoño, 
alias Timochenko, in his speech at the signing of the agreement offered his ‘sincere apologies 
to all the victims of the conflict for all the pain we may have caused in this war’ (Londoño, 
2016). Even if the apology was just symbolic, it was welcomed by the associations of victims. 
‘I felt a great satisfaction. I wanted to hear this apology from them [FARC]’, stated María Lobo, 
leader of the National Association of Rural Users. ‘Those of us who have suffered the violence 
long for a country in peace. We lost our loved ones, how can we not want peace?’ she asked 
(Fajardo, 2016).  
 
The FARC actually demanded compromises from its own side to the point that they led to the 
formation of splinter groups, and the weakening of internal trust. These compromises were 
justified as a means to give space for the removal of distrust towards the government. Overall, 
the agreement includes a number of testing trade-offs between peace and justice for all the 
participants (Corrales, 2016; MacGinty and Özerdem, 2019). This paradox of internal 
weakening of trust bonds in order to allow space for the removal of distrust towards the other 
actors is a pragmatic and calculative approach (Filippidou, 2008). 
 
The FARC also appeared to adopt a more pragmatic approach regarding the negotiating 
agenda. They accepted that the negotiations would not address all the core issues that inspired 
its struggle. The initial six-point agenda was limited and helped to start building trust and belief 
in the commitment of the conflicting parties to find a lasting solution. The idea was to help 
build a working space by addressing easier issues, which would then open the way for the 
parties to address the root causes of the conflict through in-depth negotiations (Kelman, 2005). 
The six-point agenda included agrarian reform, political inclusion, drug policy, victims’ rights, 
DDR (disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration), and implementation. The breaking 
down of the agenda into manageable issues made it easier for the negotiating parties to tackle 
and made it possible to show progress in the talks, which in turn facilitated trust building. The 
condensed but at the same time inclusive six-point agenda along with the mindset that ‘nothing 
is agreed until everything is agreed’ allowed time and space for the participants to develop a degree of 
trust on different issues and with different participants. Trust and distrust are not binary, and as 
mentioned in the first part of the article, they are rather active processes that operate alongside 
and in opposition to one another instead of on a spectrum. Trust and distrust are dynamic and 
not exclusive. In a complex peace process like in Colombia, trust and distrust tend to be 
something that can exist to some degree and in different ways. To paraphrase Hosking (2014) 
there are constantly changing gradations of trust and distrust adding to the complexity of a 
peace process.  
 
International involvement was constrained by the weakness of the process itself (Arnson and 
Whitfield, 2005). One of the outcomes of past unsuccessful peace efforts was the realisation 
that a greater international role would be necessary for any future peace process in Colombia 
to stand a chance of success. Also, the issue of representativeness and balance was dealt with 
through the breadth of the brokers, whereby four countries played formal roles in the 
negotiations after an invitation from the conflicting parties, with a UN mission establishing 
ties. Cuba and Norway were appointed as guarantor countries, and Venezuela and Chile were 
chosen as accompanying countries. Santos emphasised that ‘without the international 
community I would not have signed the agreement’ (Santos statement, 29 October 2019). The 
common denominator of the different brokers was the commitment to a peaceful resolution, 
while the number and different type of brokers gave the feeling of self-regulation, and at the 
same time allowed each conflicting side to feel represented (MacGinty and Özerdem, 2019; 
Kreutz and Nussio, 2019). This facilitated stages towards the reduction in levels of distrust 
between the conflicting parties. In this sense the negotiations had proactive external support, 
even though they were conducted by the conflicting parties directly. The combination of 
external guarantors and local responsibility and ownership of the negotiations reassured the 
conflicting parties and civil society, and enhanced confidence and multi-level trust building. 
 
During the talks in Havana, the FARC delegation was composed entirely of combatants, as the 
government chose to call the members of FARC, led by the second-in-command Iván Márquez 
(Mesa de Conversaciones, 2017). The FARC delegation was hosted in a residential area owned 
by the Cuban government near the hotel where the talks were taking place. To ensure internal 
ownership and commitment from the FARC, the organisation alternated the commanders 
participating in the talks. This approach enhanced internal trust and between the FARC and its 
supporters. The Colombian peace process adopted a multi-level approach to trust building. The 
trust building measures were not just addressed towards the two main conflicting parties, but 
also towards the public. In 2014, the Colombian government and the FARC announced a Joint 
Declaration of Principles outlining their commitment to ensure victims’ rights to truth, justice 
reparations and guarantees of non-repetition (Mesa de Conversaciones, 2014). To enhance trust 
in the process the Colombian Congress passed several laws, including a law that shields the 
peace agreement from possible amendments by later administrations (Marco Jurídico para la 
Paz, 2017). In addition, the Congress created Peace Commissions in both houses of parliament 
and promoted several public fora.  
 
The long duration of the conflict in Colombia led to the formation of a very active civil society 
with extensive experience in recording and monitoring human rights violations and promoting 
peace at multiple levels. In past negotiations the government and the FARC saw themselves as 
the true and sole representatives of the Colombian society (Equipo Paz Gobierno, 2017). 
During the latest round of talks public opinion and public participation were fundamental. Civil 
society formally participated in the process through public fora in Colombia, which the 
government and the FARC commissioned the National University and the UNDP to convene. 
At the same time, the Colombian Congress convened several roundtables in different regions 
of the country. Throughout the talks the Peace Panels engaged with civil society and they 
invited Colombians to submit written proposals (Equipo Paz Gobierno, 2017). The parties 
jointly invited five delegations of twelve victims, carefully chosen by the UN, to represent the 
diversity of the victims, as well as a Gender Subcommission inviting three delegations from 
women’s organisations (BBC, 2016).  
 
Both informal and formal civil society participation in the talks had a strong impact on the 
peace process. Participation was reflected by the fact that each agenda item in the Havana 
negotiations was followed by public discussions in Colombia, and in turn these discussions 
influenced the direction of the peace talks in Havana. Methodologically, the process included 
both secret and public talks. The public nature of the talks facilitated trust building between the 
conflicting parties and the people. Initially, when trust was lower, civil participation was more 
informal; as the process progressed and some level of trust was achieved, then civil 
participation became more formal.  
 
Processes aimed at resolving lasting conflicts operate across multiple-levels, and they 
necessitate the buying in of various actors in distinct phases and to a different extent within a 
constantly changing socio-political environment. Under these circumstances and realistically, 
different shades of trust are dispersed unevenly between actors, across the different levels, and 
over different issues. The Colombian peace process included a number of actors dispersed 
across different levels, and included a number of issues summarised within the six-issue 
agenda. The more complex the process and the more actors involved the higher the risk for the 
process to collapse. On the other however, the more inclusive the process, subject and actor-
wise, the more the opportunities for trust building (Filippidou, 2008). Furthermore, when 
negotiations on a number of issues take place in parallel and simultaneously this increases the 
chances for overall progress. That is, if there is lack of progress on one subject, progress can 
still be made on other issues on the agenda. The logic behind parallel simultaneous talks is that 
enough time, and effort is invested that helps maintain momentum, which in turn shows 
commitment to the peace process, leading to further trust building and to buying in from the 
participants to tackle the remaining issues (Filippidou, 2008). Adding to the above complexity 
is the fact that trust is not uniform and homogeneous. During a peace process an actor for 
instance, may trust a government or another actor on certain issues but not on others, or may 
have varied degrees of trust, and this would be true for all participants involved. As the diagram 
below demonstrates, once an organisation or a person decides to participate in a process with 
the intent to resolve a conflict, to a different extent they all play a role in building either thin 
or thick trust. Trust building has to take place within each different level and across the different 
levels, and the more time, and effort is invested on the process the more trust is build or the 
deeper trust becomes. For a peace process to stand a chance of success the broader community 
represented at the lower level of the pyramid, and the political elite, at the top of the pyramid, 
who negotiate the agreement have to work together towards a common end. Thus, there should 
not be a distinction between public and elite trust regarding trust building. After all, the political 
elite is also part of the broader community, and any peace agreement is from all involved for 





Table 2 please 
The above does not mean that the process was straightforward, and with no risks of failure.  
Killings of guerrillas, activists, and soldiers continued throughout the peace process and after 
the signing of the agreement (Fundación Paz y Reconcilación, 2018; The New York Times, 
2015; Reuters, 2019). However, the peace process had enough momentum, and there was 
enough domestic and international support, as well as pressure to protect the peace process and 
avoid its derailment. Every time the peace process reached a low point, it chipped away from 
whatever little trust there was. Still, the process did not collapse which at the very least indicates 
that there was enough will to trust. Furthermore, the very structure of the talks with their 
lengthy nature provided sufficient space and time for the participants to explore options and 
alternatives and facilitated mindset change. The alternative to the peace process and the risk of 
a return to the status quo ante acted as an incentive to reach a viable agreement.  
 
Another very low point of the peace process was the referendum for the ratification of the 
agreement. When the Colombian people were asked to ratify the agreement in a referendum, 
the negotiators asked the people the question ¿Apoya el acuerdo final para terminación del 
conflicto y construcción de una paz estable y duradera? (Do you support the final agreement 
to end the conflict and build a stable and lasting peace?) (El Tiempo, 2016). Trust is 
conditional, and it depends on output and not just outcome, and the people rejected the 
agreement in a surprise result, where 50.2% of voters rejected the agreement, compared to 
49.8% who voted for it. However, the turnout was very low, with fewer than 38% of 
Colombians casting a vote (Registraduría nacional del estado civil, 2016). The majority of 
those who voted ‘no’ argued that the peace agreement was letting the FARC to ‘get away with 
murder’ (BBC, 2016). According to Juan Carlos Vélez, the campaign manager from the 
Uribista right, he encouraged an emotional reaction with the use of lies in order to vote ‘no’ 
out of anger (Vélez, 2016). For Santos ‘the question is how much justice you sacrifice. People 
are always not satisfied. There is a need to draw the line in different places according to 
conditions of conflict. Better to live in imperfect peace. [The key is to] implement with more 
force instead of trying to change the agreement.’ (Santos statement, 29 October 2019). 
Londoño after the referendum result was quick to assert that ‘the FARC maintain their wish 
for peace and will only use words in order to build it’ (Londoño, 2016). Enough time and effort 
had been invested and with some amendments the agreement received parliamentary approval. 
The more the Colombian government and the FARC invested in trust building measures and 
earned the people’s trust, the more the agreement gained legitimacy, which in turn enhanced 
the trust in the negotiators and the peace process.  
 
The Colombian peace agreement comprises 297 dense pages of text, embodying very 
challenging trade-offs. Colombia has tried to overcome the dilemma between peace and justice 
with the methodologically detailed peace process and the emphasis on people’s participation 
in the process. Respect for human rights is one of the main indicators used to measure 
improvement and the implementation of the agreement. The agreement includes several testing 
trade-offs between peace and justice, and evidently this is another imperfect agreement. 
Ultimately, the success of any peace agreement depends on its implementation and Colombia 
is a country where the writ of the state extends to about 40 per cent of the country’s territory. 
The local authorities of thirty-two departments will have to implement a programme of 
assistance and reparations for hundreds of thousands of registered victims and millions of 
internally displaced people. There will also be a need to reintegrate thousands of combatants 
and deal with restitution of land where several contradictory title deeds are in place (Oficina 
del Alto Comisionado para la Paz, 2017). For the implementation of the agreement, the 
challenge will be to strike a fine balance between credibility and compromise. The signing of 
the final agreement and its ratification is just the beginning of a lengthy process of moving 
from conflict termination toward resolution and reconciliation. Throughout the distinct phases 
of the peace process trust-building has to be maintained, reviewed and enhanced constantly, to 
establish sustainable peace. For Santos  
 
Peace making is over and done. It was quicker than other agreements, but the process 
of healing of years of war has started. There is multiple overlapping forms of violence 
but there is also commitment for three governments to not change the agreement. A 
couple of dissidents are a lot of noise but no substance. More than 92% of FARC are 
complying (Santos statement, 29 October 2019).  
 
The breaking down of the agenda into manageable issues helped the negotiating parties to show 
progress in the talks and therefore facilitate trust building. The idea was to create an initial 
working space by addressing easier issues, which would then open the way for the parties to 
address the deeper causes of the conflict, once distrust would start to reverse. Additionally, in 
order to boost trust the Colombian Congress passed several laws, including a law that protects 
the accord from possible amendments by later administrations (Marco Jurídico para la Paz, 
2017). According to the third report of the Kroc Institute, which monitors the progress and 
implementation of the peace accord, one third (35%) of the accord’s commitments have 
reached advanced levels of implementation. This means they have been fully implemented 
(23%) or are expected to be fully implemented (12%) within the timeframe stipulated by the 
Agreement. At the same time, thirty-four percent of the commitments are in a state of minimal 
implementation, and thirty-one percent of the total commitments have yet to begin 
implementation (Cortright, 2019). 
In reality the signing of an agreement is just the beginning of a very lengthy and arduous period, 
where the momentum that existed during the talks and up to the signing of the agreement will 
have to be maintained during the implementation phase. However, more often than not the 
implementation phase is slow, and life does not allow a vacuum to exist. New and splinter 
armed groups have moved in to fill any vacuum left by the FARC or the government. When 
the peace agreement was signed, the estimated cost to materialise the promises was in the 
region of $45billion over a period of at least fifteen years in an economy that today is not doing 
as well as at the time of the signing of the agreement (Casey, 2019). Empirically, however, for 
a variety of reasons the signing of agreements is followed by splinter groups of different size 
and impact (MacGinty and Özerdem, 2019; Filippidou, 2008). The point is how expectations 
are managed and how much buying in there is from all those involved. After all, if an agreement 
is reached thanks to the contributions from all levels of society, the same should apply for its 




This article has examined the relatively successful negotiation of an end to the conflict between 
the government of Colombia and the FARC and has illustrated the challenges involved under 
conditions of distrust. The complex and multi-layered nature of the conflict had resulted in 
several failed attempts, frustrated by actions taken in bad faith on both sides, such as the 
destruction of the PU by the state and kidnappings by the FARC. These had a negative effect 
on the ability of participants to build relationships, as they reinforced perceptions of distrust 
and strengthened trust bonds within the contending groups. There had also been a low level of 
public support for demobilisation previously (Guáqueta, 2007), due to predatory behaviour of 
the FARC and right-wing paramilitary groups (see Nussio, 2011; Saab and Taylor, 2009). In 
such an environment, moving away from conflict involves a coordinated approach between 
actors at various stages, which is difficult to achieve when the costs of failure may be 
significant. The diagram below, adapted from Verdeja, highlights the key ideas on thin and 
thick trust analysed in the article. In an ideal situation in a peace process there is a constant 
movement towards the direction of the arrow.  
 
Table 3 please 
 
However, as the article has demonstrated, life is neither this linear nor that simple. There are 
gradations of trust and distrust, and the two are not exclusive, rather there is a plethora of 
combinations between individuals, organisations and issues in a peace process. In the 
Colombian peace process, trust and distrust exists in different degrees and in different ways.  
 
The analysis shows that a focus on trust building measures between conflicting parties alone is 
unlikely to be successful, due to entrenched distrust and the potential costs associated with 
failure. The case also demonstrates the importance of a contractual approach in providing 
certainty through the existence of sanction for breaches and defining clear roles for those 
involved. During the process it was possible to adopt a coordinated approach through the 
distinct stages of the negotiation, ensuring enough political will to achieve a solution that was 
maintained over time. The strengthening of ties meant that the result of the referendum did not 




 Although no two peace processes are identical, at the same time no peace process is entirely 
unique. Most conflict resolution efforts learn and borrow from other processes, but they have 
to innovate to reflect the challenges present in the local context. These innovations in turn 
become a reference point for other conflict resolution efforts. The main innovations of the 
Colombian peace process are the distinction between peace negotiations, which have a short 
term and immediate focus, and the peace process, which has a longer-term focus. A condensed 
but inclusive agenda of six points along with the negotiating rule ‘nothing is agreed until 
everything is agreed’ demonstrated commitment to discuss thoroughly all issues (Herbolzheimer, 
2019). The peace process positions the victims at the epicentre of the negotiations, giving them 
a direct role in the talks; addressing the structural problem of rural development; establishing 
a Gender Subcommission; and most importantly, planning and providing for the 
implementation of the agreement while it was still being negotiated well before it was signed. 
Reparation of victims, such as free housing was put at the centre of the process, and according 
to Santos  people would say to him that ‘I will never stop being a victim but now I can see the 
future’ (Santos statement, 29 October 2019). In addition to the comprehensive approach, the 
Colombian process was inclusive regarding the number and variety of actors involved in the 
talks. As MacGinty’s research demonstrates, the most significant factor in helping parties reach 
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